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STEPS TOWARDS AND ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN SOUTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES: A RETURN TO TRIPS
Ana Santos Rutschman*
I. INTRODUCTION
Some of the most instrumental players in shaping the course of intellectual
property policies in the South are the so-called BRIC countries.1 The acronym
BRIC originally encompassed Brazil, Russia, India and China. In 2011, South
Africa formally joined the BRIC countries, which are now referred to either by the
original acronym or by BRICS.2 While categorizations like BRICS attract a fair
amount of criticism, with questions surrounding the criteria used to aggregate
disparate economies,3 the concept of emerging economies in the Global South
seeking to advance similar development agendas has become accepted currency in
multiple fields, from institutional cooperation to financial analysis and
investment.4

*

Innovation Fellow at the Innovation and Technology Lab, Duke University.
1. See JIM O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP: ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND
(2011); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual
Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5(3) NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007) (giving an
analysis of the role of intellectual property norms in BRIC countries).
2. A more recent construct is that of MINT countries, which comprise Mexico, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Turkey. These are densely populated, strategically located developing countries with
promising recent and prospective economic growth patterns. See Jim O’Neill, Who You Calling a
BRIC?, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 12, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/201311-12/who-you-calling-a-bric-; Kyle Caldwell, How to invest in the ‘Mint’ emerging markets,
TELEGRAPH, (Jan. 17, 2014, 7:58 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/10580108/How-to-invest-in-the-Mintemerging-markets.html (showing a survey of the use of the acronym MINT in the press and in
colloquial discourse); Jackie Northam, The Global Economy: A World Of Acronyms, NPR (May 13,
2014, 3:04 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/05/13/311852601/the-global-economy-willmint-countries-be-the-new-brics.
3. This has been particularly evident in the case of MINT countries. See Roger Bootle, The
MINTs are Very Different and Might not All See Stellar Growth, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 12, 2014, 8:07 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/rogerbootle/10567196/Roger-Bootle-The-MINTs-arevery-different-and-might-not-all-see-stellar-growth.html; Carolyn Cohn, BRIC or MINT? Investors
Suffer Acronym Anxiety, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2014, 7:04 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/ 2014/01/20/
emerging-investment -acronyms-idINDEEA0J0DD20140120. Even if flawed, artificial categorizations
may actually yield some benefits for some of the targeted countries. For instance, in the case of
Nigeria, which is the only MINT country that is not a member of the G20, it has been pointed out that
the creation of the acronym could generate enough pressure for Nigeria to join the group. The Mint
countries: Next economic giants?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2014, 19:36 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25548060.
4. Since 2009, the BRICS hold an annual summit. See VI BRICS SUMMIT: MINISTRY OF
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Since the first BRIC summit in 2009, the range of areas on which the BRICS
cooperate or plan to cooperate has expanded considerably.5 One of the issue areas
that gained increasing attention from BRICS policy-makers is intellectual property.
This has been particularly true since 2013, when these countries signed their first
agreement on cooperation between intellectual property offices.6 The agreement,
known as the Roadmap, focuses primarily on cooperation in patent matters, and
has the potential to trigger an alignment of patent policies in the South—or, more
accurately, in the most economically-empowered arenas of the South.
As the Roadmap comes into force, this article explores options for further
cooperation between BRICS—and, potentially, developing countries in general—
beyond the patent field. It begins by noting that patent law, in the form of
flexibilities within the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement” or “TRIPS”),7 has consistently been at the
heart of the boldest and most controversial intellectual property measures adopted
by some of the leading economies of the South.8 It then describes the main
features of the recent Roadmap, with an emphasis on its patent-centric design. The
article proceeds to propose a set of TRIPS-compatible measures outside patent law
that countries seeking to advance development agendas have yet to explore. In an
era in which post-TRIPS and post-World Trade Organization (“WTO”)
approaches9 often relegate treaty interpretation to a residual position, these
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, http://www.brics6.itamaraty.gov.br (last visited Feb. 7, 2015); Katy Watson,
Brics Summit: Banking on a New Global Order, BBC NEWS (July 13, 2014 19:01),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28235378.
In 2014, the BRICS established a multilateral
development bank, the New Development Bank, headquartered in Shanghai. Agreement on the New
Development Bank- Fortaleza, July 15, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15,
2014), http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/media2/press-releases/219-agreement-on-the-new-developmentbank-fortaleza-july-15; Raj M. Desai & James Raymond Vreeland, What the New Bank of BRICS is All
About,
WASH. POST
(July
17,
2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkeycage/wp/2014/07/17/what-the-new-bank-of-brics-is-all-about/.
5. Compare the Joint Statement produced in the 2009 summit with the Action Plans that
emerged from the 2013 and 2014 summit. First Summit: Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries
Leaders, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (June 16, 2009),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/114-first-summit-2.
The
2013
Declaration and Action Plan established the creation of the BRICS Development Bank, which would
eventually become the New Development Bank. Fifth Summit: eThekwini Declaration and Action
Plan,
VI
BRICS
SUMMIT
MINISTRY
OF
EXTERNAL
REL.
(Mar.
27,
2013),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/69-fifth-summit; Sixth Summit: Fortaleza
Declaration and Action Plan, VI BRICS SUMMIT MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL REL. (July 15, 2014),
http://brics6.itamaraty.gov.br/category-english/21-documents/223-sixth-summit-declaration-and-actionplan.
6. BRICS TRADE AND INVESTMENT COOPERATION FRAMEWORK, art 4.5 (2013),
http://www.brics5.co.za/assets/BRICS-Trade-and-Investment-Cooperation-Framework.pdf [hereinafter
COOPERATION FRAMEWORK]; William New, BRICS Launch Their Own Plan for IP Cooperation; India
Defends Itself, IP WATCH, (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/11/27/brics-launch-theirown-plan-for-ip-cooperation-india-defends-itself/.
7. Specifically, the flexibilities associated with compulsory licensing.
8. This would be the case of Brazil and India, who paved the way for compulsory licensing of
patented drugs, thus bolstering the development of domestic generics markets.
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 Apr. 1994,
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measures are derived from TRIPS and have the potential to further the innovation
agendas of developing countries without increasing the overall levels of domestic
intellectual property protection.
II. CONTOURS OF A PROGRESSIVE ALIGNMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM
COMPULSORY LICENSING IN THE BRICS TO THE 2013 ROADMAP
A.

An Overview of Compulsory Licensing in the BRICS

So far, the greatest intellectual property showdowns between the South and
the North have taken place in the patent field, specifically in the pharmaceutical
arena, with generics being at the center of most political and legal disputes.10
Tensions between manufacturers of patented drugs in the North and generic
industries11 fueled the first years of TRIPS implementation and continue to the
present day, amid trade threats12 and WTO disputes.13 Unsurprisingly, several of
the BRICS have been at the center of these controversies. India, which grew a
globally competitive generics industry by not recognizing pharmaceutical patents
for several decades after 1972, finally amended its patent law in 2005 to comply
with TRIPS obligations.14 In the late 1990s and early 2000s, South Africa
underwent a long war with manufacturers of patented drugs in an effort to curb its
AIDS epidemics.15 Today, South Africa is revising its intellectual property laws to
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
10. See Enrico Bonadio & Carlo Maria Cantore, Seizures of In-Transit Generics at the EU
Borders: India and Brazil v. The EU, 1 EUR. J. RISK REG. 404, 404-408 (2010); Robert Ineson et al.,
U.S. Retaliates After Thai, Brazilian Decisions on Pharmaceutical IP, IHS (July 4, 2007),
https://www.ihs.com/country-industry-forecasting.html?ID=106597914;.Compulsory
License
Application No. 1 of 2011, Application for Compulsory License under Section 84(1) of the Patents Act,
1970 in respect of Patent No.215758 (Natco Pharma Limited v. Bayer Corp.) C.L.A. No. 1 of 2011
(2012) [hereinafter Natco], http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/compulsory_license_12032012.pdf. The
Special 301 Reports issued yearly by the Office of the United States Trade Representative also attest to
the ideological tensions between patent policies in the South (and, in particular, within the BRICS) and
the United States. See Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411
11. See Amir Attaran, How Do Patents And Economic Policies Affect Access To Essential
Medicines In Developing Countries?, 23 HEALTH AFF. 155, 155-166 (2004) (discussing the role that
patents play in access to medicines throughout the South); David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic
Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37 (2005) (discussing structural relationships within
the generics industries); C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 (4) J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613 (2011) (discussing an econometric analysis of postHatch-Waxman Act competition between the generic industry and brand-name manufacturers of drugs).
12. See, e.g., Robert Ineson et al., supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. See Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s Patent
System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 (2007); Shamnad
Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS: The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 1
(2005); Brenda Waning et al., A Lifeline to Treatment: The Role of Indian Generic Manufacturers in
Supplying Antiretroviral Medicines to Developing Countries, 13 J. INT. AIDS SOCIETY 35 (2010).
15. David Barnard, In the High Court of South Africa, Case No. 4138/98: The Global Politics of
Access to Low-Cost AIDS Drugs in Poor Countries, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 159 (2002); WILLIAM
W. FISHER III & DR. CYRILL P. RIGAMONTI, THE SOUTH AFRICA AIDS CONTROVERSY A CASE STUDY
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position itself as a leader in generic drug manufacturing.16
Brazil is often credited with being the savviest of developing countries in
playing the “court of public opinion” to jump-start the generics industry.17 In
1997, a local working requirement was incorporated into Brazilian domestic patent
law.18 In 1999, Brazil passed legislation enabling compulsory licensing for noncommercial public uses of patents in cases of national emergency and public
interest.19 While these legislative reforms were applicable to all fields of
technology, Brazil took advantage of the ongoing debate surrounding the AIDS
patents in South Africa to tie its patent reform both to AIDS crisis and, more
broadly, to the claims of access to medicines movements around the developing
world.20 Brazil’s careful framing of the situation, which at one point acquired
human rights contours, succeeded in breaking resistance from the North, with the
United States dropping a WTO complaint about the Brazilian patent reform.21
India, which took significantly longer to grant compulsory licenses, faced the
same kind of international pressure when it issued its first license. In 2012, the
Controller of Patents in Mumbai approved compulsory licensing of Nexavar, a
drug patented by Bayer.22 Prompt response from the United States framed the
approval as an undue restriction of intellectual property rights:
India’s decision in this case to restrict patent rights of an innovator
based, in part, on the innovator’s decision to import its products, rather
than manufacture them in India, establishes a troubling precedent.
Unless overturned, the decision could potentially compel innovators
outside India—including those in sectors well beyond pharmaceuticals,
such as green technology and information and communications
technology—to manufacture in India in order to avoid being forced to
license an invention to third parties.23

India’s first foray into compulsory licensing has contributed to the decision to
IN PATENT LAW AND POLICY

(2005), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/South%20Africa.pdf.
16. Tiisetso Motsoeneng, South Africa Slams Big Pharma in Generic Drugs Row, REUTERS (Jan.
17,
2014
6:57
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/17/us-safrica-pharmaidUSBREA0G0N720140117.
17. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407.
18. Id. at 406.
19. Decree No. 3.201 of October 6, 1999 (Compulsory Licenses in Cases of National Emergency
and Public Interest), WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=516 (last visited Feb. 9,
2015).
20. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 407; Jane Galvão, Brazil and Access to
HIV/AIDS Drugs: A Question of Human Rights and Public Health, 95 (7) AM J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1110,
1110–13 (July 2005); Pascual Ortells, Brazil: A Model Response to AIDS, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (April
2003), https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/211/44923.html; Claudia Jurberg;
Brazil Declares Patented AIDS Drug of Public Interest, Could Expand Access, IP WATCH (Apr. 22,
2008), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1015.
21. See Chakravarthi Raghavan, US Beats a (Tactical) Retreat over Brazil’s Patent Law, THIRD
WORLD NETWORK (June 25, 2001), http://www.twn.my/title/tactical.htm.
22. Natco, supra note 10 art 15.
23. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (USTR), 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 39 (2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf.
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keep the country on the higher level of the U.S. 301 Watch List (priority watch).24
Brazil, on the other hand, has moved from the priority watch list to the lower
category (watch list).25
Among the other BRICS, China amended its law in 2012 to enable
compulsory licensing of generics,26 but so far no use has been made of the new
provisions.27 Similarly, Russian patent law contemplates the possibility of
compulsory licensing, but there are no reports of any activity as to its progress.28
Protection of pharmaceuticals is therefore moving towards alignment among the
BRICS group.29 All founding BRIC countries have compulsory licensing schemes
in place, albeit the regimes differ slightly from one country to another.30 South
Africa is in the process of amending its patent to bring it more into consonance
with practices in the other leading economies of the developing world.31
Even outside the BRICS zone, compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals has
been expanding. One of the most well-known cases is Thailand, which issued a
compulsory license for Efavirenz, a drug used in the treatment of HIV, in 2006.32
There has also been compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals throughout different
regions of the Global South, from Indonesia and Malaysia to the Dominican
Republic, to Ghana and Mozambique, to name a few examples.33
As TRIPS reaches the end of its second decade of existence,34 the most
prominent point of convergence of intellectual property policies in the South has
revolved around compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals. This convergence does
not appear to result from concerted efforts among developing countries (or even
24. Id. at 6. Since 1989, the USTR has enacted annual Section 301 Special Reports, identifying
countries that do not effectively protect intellectual property rights. Countries with intellectual property
violations considered particularly serious (in the optic of the USTR) are placed under a Priority Watch
List, whereas countries of concern but deemed less problematic are placed in the Watch List.
25. Id.
26. Lynne Taylor, China Amends Patent Laws to Enable Compulsory Licensing, PHARMA TIMES
DIGITAL
(June
3,
2012),
http://www.pharmatimes.com/article/12-0613/China_amends_patent_laws_to_enable_compulsory_licensing.aspx.
27. Although, in 2005, China’s threats to issue a compulsory license eventually led to voluntary
licenses for the manufacture of generic versions of Tamiflu. JAMES PACKARD LOVE, RECENT
EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSES ON PATENTS 12 (2007),
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf.
28. Maria Nilova & Vadim Chagin, A Changing Landscape: Life Sciences in Russia, WORLD
INTELL. PROP. REV. (May 1, 2012), http://www.worldipreview.com/article/a-changing-landscape-lifesciences-in-russia.
29. The Emerging BRIC Economies, supra note 1, at 416.
30. Id. at 420.
31. Lynne Taylor, S Africa Pledges Action on Compulsory Licenses, Parallel Imports, PHARMA
TIMES DIGITAL, (Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.pharmatimes.com/Article/13-1107/S_Africa_pledges_action_on_compulsory_licenses_parallel_imports.aspx.
32. See Robert Steinbrook, Thailand and the Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz, 356 N. ENGL. J.
MED. 544 , 544 (Feb. 8, 2007).
33. See JAMES PACKARD LOVE, supra note 27.
34. Nearly a decade and a half has passed since WTO members adopted the Doha Declaration.
See DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, (Nov. 14, 2001).
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amidst the BRICS), but rather from an informal alignment of policies (and politics)
surrounding a highly sensitive area. The situation may soon change; however, the
intellectual property offices of the BRICS have recently signed a cooperation
agreement to exchange best practices and potentially align their domestic
intellectual property procedures and policies.
B.

The 2013 Roadmap: Alignment of Polices in the Patent Field

At the 2012 BRICS Summit, held in Durban, South Africa, the trade ministers
of the BRICS endorsed a Trade and Investment Cooperation Framework,35 which
was signed in March 2013. This agreement establishes an “open-ended and
progressive”36 framework with the primary purpose of “[p]romoting trade,
investment and economic cooperation” among BRICS members.37 While
intellectual property is not the only target of this trade-centric framework,
cooperation in “high technology areas”38 and on IP rights is prominently
endorsed.39
As a consequence, in May 2013, the intellectual property offices of the BRIC
countries agreed on an Intellectual Property Cooperation Roadmap (“Roadmap”)
in Magaliesburg, South Africa, seeking “to enhance cooperation between the
respective BRICS IP offices with a view to enhancing the value of IP and to ensure
its contribution to the economic development and growth in the member
countries.”40
A reading of the prongs of the Roadmap indicates that its main focus is
patentable innovation. The agreement identifies the following “cooperation
streams:”
1. Training of Intellectual Property Office Staff
2. IP/Patent processes
classification and translation

and

procedures

including

search,

35. Cooperation Framework, supra note 6.
36. Id. art. 2.2.
37. Id. art. 3.1.
38. Id. art. 4.3.1.
39. Article 4 of the Cooperation Framework, entitled “Areas of Work,” expressly contemplate
inter-BRICS cooperation to promote innovation (4.3) and to enhance information exchange and
capacity building in the intellectual property field (4.5):
4.3 Innovation Cooperation: 4.3.1 Establishing project platforms to promote communication
and cooperation in high- technology areas. 4.3.2 Encouraging the expansion of trade and
investment in high value-added products. 4.3.3 Advancing dialogue and communications in
emerging industries, and promoting trade and investment in industries that are technology-,
knowledge-, or capital- intensive. [4.4 omitted] 4.5 Cooperation on Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR): 4.5.1 Enhancing information exchange on IPR legislation and enforcement
through meetings or seminars. 4.5.2 Jointly developing capacity building programmes in the
IPR area. 4.5.3 Promoting cooperation among IPR offices.

Id. art. 4.
40. BRICS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICES COOPERATION ROADMAP 3 (2013) [hereinafter
ROADMAP],
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/SIGNED-BRICS-IPOFFICES-COOPERATION-ROADMAP.pdf.
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3. Promotion of public awareness on IP in BRICS countries
4. National IP Strategy and IP Strategy for enterprises
5. Information services on IP, e.g. exchange of patent
documentation, taking account of local legislation
6. Collaboration in International Forums as required and subject to
consensus
7. Examiner exchange programme41

Specific domestic intellectual property offices in BRIC countries have been
assigned tasks that reflect the intellectual property profile of each one of the
BRICS in the so-called post-TRIPS era.42 For instance, South Africa, which until
recently had not seriously considered implementing patent examination
procedures, is by and large excluded from leadership roles in the patent field.
Instead, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission of South Africa it is
in charge of creating “national IP strategies” and “IP strategies for enterprises.”43
Training of intellectual property staff will be led by INPI,44 the Brazilian
National Institute of Industrial Property (“The Institute”).45 The Institute was also
tasked with supervising “IP/patent processes and procedures,” an area that is
somewhat cryptically described as consisting of “search, classification [and]
translation services, among others.”46
China, through its State Intellectual Property Office, will be responsible for
“[p]romotion of [p]ublic [a]wareness on Intellectual Property in BRICS
countries”47 and for the broad category of “[i]nformation [s]ervices on IP.”48 This
cooperation stream is described as targeting the enhancement of “information
exchange on [intellectual property rights] legislation and enforcement through
meetings or seminars.”49
Rospatent, the Russian patent office, will be in charge of the examiner
exchange program, which has the goal of promoting the “exchange of experiences”
and, possibly, the exchange of examiners between patent offices of the BRICS.50
Finally, India51 will lead “collaboration in [i]nternational [f]orums as required
and subject to consensus.”52 This stream puts India in a position of acting as
liaison between the BRICS and external interest groups, institutions, and fora. It is
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.
43. William New, supra note 6.
44. ROADMAP, supra note 40, at 6.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id. at 6.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 7.
51. The Roadmaps do not specify whether a particular branch of the Indian Office of the
Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (CGPDTM) will be in charge of acting as a
liaison between the BRICS and other groups. Id.
52. Id. at 10.
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especially interesting to notice that the Roadmap establishes that the outcome of
this stream should be an “[i]mproved influence of BRICS Offices within WIPO
and other [f]orums.”53 The creation of this stream suggests that a deeper SouthSouth alignment of intellectual property policies will likely entail an emphasis on
increasing bargaining power in fora where Northern interests have historically
prevailed.
As the coming years will show how strong the BRICS’s desired South-South
alignment might become, it is already clear that the BRICS are specifically
interested in incentivizing patent policy convergence and maximizing prodevelopment strategies allowed under international patent law. The Roadmap and
the initial tasks assigned to national intellectual property offices undoubtedly set
the framework for enhanced inter-BRICS cooperation, which might possibly pave
the way towards a new understanding of South-South cooperation in intellectual
property matters. However, there is a myriad of issues beyond the sphere of
patents on which South-South dialogue has been nearly inexistent. Part III
explores some of these issues, with a focus on international copyright law. It
argues that there is neglected space under international intellectual property law for
developing countries to further their innovation agendas, particularly under TRIPS.
Finally, it suggests that adoption of these measures is unlikely to trigger the kind of
criticism and pressure from the North that patent-related reforms tend to attract.
III. (RE)DEPARTING FROM TRIPS: GOING BEYOND TRADITIONAL FLEXIBILITIES
A.

Drawing More “flexibility” from the TRIPS Agreement

In an age in which we talk about post-WTO54 and post-TRIPS55 eras, there is
a risk that one might lose sight of the fact that the architecture of our global IP
regime and its ensuing dynamics are anchored in the TRIPS Agreement and will
likely be so for decades to come. More accurately, they are anchored in a certain
interpretation of TRIPS that privileges the interests and bargaining power of the
North.56 Nonetheless, TRIPS remains the legal framework within which
developing countries have to operate. At the same time, it has been abundantly
emphasized that TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement,57 and that there is

53. Id.
54. See Daniel Benoliel & Bruno Salama, Towards an Intellectual Property Bargaining Theory:
The Post-WTO Era, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 265 (2010); Peter Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II):
Protecting Intellectual Property in Power WTO China, 55 (4) AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) (regarding to
the usage of the expression in connection with BRIC countries). The term has spilled into fields outside
law. See e.g., Ranjanendra Narayan Nag & Bhaskar Goswami, Dual Economy Interlinkage in a
Monetary Framework: A Post WTO Perspective, 20 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 497, 497-510 (2005).
55. The expression has attained global usage over the last decade. See, BURCU KILIÇ, BOOSTING
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION IN THE POST-TRIPS ERA: REAL-LIFE LESSONS FOR THE DEVELOPING
WORLD (2014); Kenneth Shadlen, Reforming and Reinforcing the Revolution: The Post-TRIPS Politics
of Patents in Latin America 1-21 (Global Dev. and Env’t Inst., Working Paper No. 09-02, 2009).
56. See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-5 (2008).
57. See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under
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ample space in the treaty of which countries in the Global South are not making
use in advancing their innovation agendas.58
Some of this space is created by TRIPS flexibilities.59 Compulsory licensing
is the most prominent example of countries in the South taking advantage of these
flexibilities and, as seen in the previous section, some of the BRICS are paving the
way for other developing countries wishing to incentivize the growth of domestic
generic industries.
Yet, countries in the South can find room in TRIPS outside the realm of
traditional flexibilities to further normative frameworks more suited to their
interests and developmental stages. While TRIPS is not the only source of
pressure for developing countries to adopt TRIPS-plus standards,60 there is an
array of measures—particularly in the field of copyright—that 1) are TRIPScompatible, 2) do not increase the overall levels of intellectual property protection,
and 3) are less likely to attract the level of scrutiny that patent-related flexibilities
have historically triggered.61
The following section surveys these options. The list does not configure a set
of measures that developing countries should adopt en bloc; rather, it illustrates
individual proposals that would bring elements of flexibility into national
intellectual property (namely copyright) regimes.
B.

Proposals

This section analyzes the following proposals: 1) the adoption of fair use

the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT’L LAW. 345 (1995). See also Denis Borges
Barbosa, Minimum Standards vs. Harmonization in the TRIPS Context: The Nature of Obligations
under TRIPS and Modes of Implementation at the National Level in Monist and Dualist Systems, in 1
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES 52-109
(Carolos M. Correa ed., 2010)
58. See Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 (4) HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (2009).
59. See Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation between TRIPS and
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS Flexibilities?, 18 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 420 (2011) (discussing the tension between TRIPS flexibilities and the widespread de
facto application of TRIPS-plus standards). See Duncan. Matthews, TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to
Medicines in Developing Countries: the Problem with Technical Assistance and Free Trade
Agreements, 27 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 420, 420-427 (2005) (providing an overview of flexibilities in
the specific context of access to medicines in the Global South); see also Sisule Musungu at al.,
Utilizing Trips Flexibilities For Public Health Protection Through South-South Regional Frameworks,
S. CENTRE (Apr. 2004), http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/collect/medicinedocs/pdf/s4968e/s4968e.pdf.
60. See DEERE, supra note 56 (surveying the economic and ideational pressures developing
countries face in building their domestic intellectual property frameworks). For an account of the web
of bilateral and multilateral agreements that push forward TRIPS-plus agendas, see Susan K. Sell,
TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum Shifting, FTAS, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447
(2011) (noting that TRIPS is not the only source of pressure on intellectual property regimes for
countries in the South, as well as in the North); see also Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Agreements, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125
(2004).
61. See USTR, supra note 23.
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standards; 2) the adoption of flexible licensing mechanisms; 3) the reconsideration
of formalities in copyright law; 4) the creation of take-and-pay regimes; 5) the
creation of a “local working requirement”-like provision in domestic copyright
laws; 6) the removal of paying public domains; and 7) the reconsideration of moral
rights.
1. Adoption of Fair Use Standards
The doctrine of fair use remains largely associated with American case law.62
In The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook, however, Band and Gerafi note that are
over forty countries in the world with copyright laws that establish fair use or fair
dealing63 provisions.64 Band and Gerafi also note that fair use/dealing regimes
cover more than one-third of the world’s population, including a significant
number of developing countries.65 The split is heavily skewered towards fair
dealing, as the map below illustrates:

62. For a cogent analysis of the mechanisms under which fair use operates, see William W. Fisher
III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1744-1783 (1988).
63. JONATHAN BAND & JONATHAN GERAFI, THE FAIR USE/FAIR DEALING HANDBOOK 1 (2013),
http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf. More limited in scope
than fair use, fair dealing originates in Chapter III of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of
1988 (Acts Permitted in relation to Copyright Works) and provides exceptions to copyright law in the
cases of research and private study (Article 29) and criticism, review and news reporting (Article 30).
See W. R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS,
TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (2003).
64. BAND & GERAFI supra note 63, at 1.
65. Id.
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Figure 1: Fair Use and Fair Dealing Around the World66
Fair use models are often presented as “balancing mechanisms” against
thickets of proprietary rights.67 Since the Copyright Act of 1976 codified fair use
in the United States,68 courts and commentators have identified several ways in
which fair use can make copyright regimes more balanced: fair use provisions can
function as “safety valves” for fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech;69
they can be used to cure market failures;70 they promote efficiency in cases where
the value of access to and use of a copyrighted work is higher than the transaction

66. Photo: Map created by Amy Bulgrien (citing BAND & GERAFI, supra note 63),
http://www.librarycopyrightalliance.org/bm~doc/worldmap.pdf.
67. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2014).
69. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 540-41 (1985).
70. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
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costs associated with negotiating a license;71 and they are a “flexible and adaptable
mechanism” that can adapt to the rise of new technologies.72
One of the main criticisms often raised by fair use opponents is that it
generates uncertainty and unpredictability.73 From a doctrinal point of view, fair
use is routinely pitched against the European model of closed lists of exceptions
and limitations.74 If approached through comparative lenses, fair use models will
always offer less legal certainty.75 However, that uncertainty is modulated by the
advantages of having regimes that, as a whole, offer more flexibility.76
Additionally, it has also been pointed out that fair use is not intrinsically
unpredictable.77 Rather, certain applications of fair use within a system might be
conflicting,78 but fair use as a normative postulate offers a cogent and stable
framework to deal with limitations on exclusive rights.79

71. Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Management Systems,
15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 44 (2001).
72. Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in
Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993).
73. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT:
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 159 (2012); Amira Dotan, Niva et. al., Fair Use
Best Practices for Higher Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.
447 (2010). Other critiques of fair use include claims that it is “doctrinally incoherent.” Matthew Sag,
Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L. J. 47, 51 (2012). Some scholars point out that there is some
tension between the U.S. model of fair use and TRIPS obligations. Ruth Okediji, Toward an
International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 115 (2000).
74. P. B. Hugenholtz & Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities 2
(University of Amsterdam, Working Paper No. 2012-39, 2011).
75. THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 149 (Annette
Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011). Also, as it has been pointed out, “There is no model that can
completely remove unpredictability from a flexible system, though proper understanding of case law
and community norms can help.” JENNIFER URBAN, REPORT 1: UPDATING FAIR USE FOR INNOVATORS
AND
CREATORS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: TWO TARGETED REFORMS 3 (2010),
https://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/fair-use-report-02132010.pdf.
76. See Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74.
77. Sag, supra note 73, at 51; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and
Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009); Michael J. Madison, A PatternOriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004).
78. See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73
79. See URBAN, supra note 75; Sag, supra note 73; Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 74.
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Of the advantages usually associated with fair use, malleability in
adapting to emerging technologies80 speaks directly to the needs of countries with
specific interests in promoting industries that rely on digital chains of production
and distribution.81
There have already been several instances in the South in which fair use
has been adopted82 or contemplated as a possibility in reforming copyright laws.83
For instance, Nigeria has adopted an ad hoc fair dealing provision for folklore.84
Uganda, which enacted its most recent copyright laws in 2003, codified a general
fair use provision in Section 15 of the Intellectual Property Act.85 The Philippines
enacted its most recent copyright law in 1997, and the following year the
Intellectual Property Code came into force.86 Chapter VII, entitled “Limitations on
Copyright,” codifies fair use.87
A particularly interesting case is that of Israel, which, following a lengthy
application of the British Copyright Act of 1911, enacted its first homebred
copyright law in 2007.88 The law codified fair use in Section 19, closely modeled

80. Carlos M. Correa, Fair Use and Access to Information in the Digital Era, in INFOETHICS
2000: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIETAL CHALLENGES OF CYBERSPACE: THIRD INTERNATIONAL
CONGRESS, NOV. 13-15, at 187, 187.
81. This would be the case of countries with relevant music or film industries (e.g. Nollywood,
the film industry in Nigeria). It would also be the case of countries with specific interests within an
industry or sector; once again, Nigeria offers an example in its protection of folklore through ad hoc fair
use. See Adebambo Adewopo, Protection and Administration of Folklore in Nigeria, in 3 SCRIPTED 1,
7-8 (March 2006).
82. Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9.
85. Intellectual Property Act 36 of 2003, §15 (Uganda),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3922.
86. Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines §185 Ch. VII, Rep. Act 8293,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=129343.
87. Id.
88. See Copyright Act, 5768-2007,2007 LSI 34, 19 (2007)(Isr.),
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=132095.

SANTOS_MARCO.DOC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

114

3/28/17 3:18 PM

DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y

after the American fair use clause.89

VOL. 43:4

Fair use was implemented in Israel

specifically as a way to foster creativity.90 In 2005, the Preamble of the draft bill
that would amend the existing copyright legislation read:
The objective of the laws of Copyright is to establish an arrangement
that will protect creative works while striking a balance between various
interests of the public good. The balance required is mainly between the
need to provide a sufficient incentive to create, which is in the form of
granting general financial rights in the creations, and between the need
to enable the public to use the creations for the advancement of culture
and knowledge. This balance must be obtained while safeguarding the
freedom of speech and freedom of creativity and while preserving free
and fair competition.91

Unlike the French-, Spanish-, and Portuguese-speaking countries in the Global
South whose copyright laws are inscribed within a legal colonial heritage that
crystalized closed lists of limitations and exceptions,92 in 2007, Israel transitioned
from British copyright law93 (which recognized fair dealing as early as in the
nineteenth century)94 to a fair use-based national law. The gap was therefore
narrower than the one in developing countries where Roman-Germanic traditions
still prevail. However, the move towards fair use had already been foreshadowed
in cases decided by Israeli courts before the TRIPS Agreement was even
89. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Israeli Fair Use from an American Perspective, in CREATING
RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach eds.,2009).
90. See Michael Birnhack, A Cultural Reading: Israel’s 2007 Copyright Act and the Creative
Field, in AUTHORING RIGHTS: READINGS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 83 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach
eds., 2009); see also Meera Nair, Canada and Israel: Cultivating Fairness of Use 11 (Program on Info.
Jus. & Intell. Prop. Working Paper No. 2012-14, 2012).
91. Nair, supra note 90, at 30 (quoting Preamble of the Draft Bill Amending the Copyright Act
(No. 196), 2005, HH. (Isr.)).
92. See HENRI MAGER, LES DROITS COLONIAUX DE LA FRANCE (1890); DROIT ET ÉCONOMIE DE
LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE (Vivant Michel ed.2014); Rodrigo Bercovitz Rodríguez-Cano et. al.,
COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DE PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL (2007); JMC TORRES, TRATADO ELEMENTAL
DE DERECHO COLONIAL ESPAÑOL (1941); Leandro Fazollo Cezario, A Estrutura Jurídica no Brasil
Colonial. Criação, ordenação e Implementação, in 1 REVISTA DO INSTITUTO DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO
9, 5249 (2012).
93. See Michael Birnhack, Mandatory Copyright: From Pre-Palestine to Israel, 1910-2007, in A
SHIFTING EMPIRE: 100 YEARS OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 1911, 16 (Uma Suthersanen & Ysolde
Gendreau eds., 2012).
94. See CORNISH & LLEWELYN, supra note 63.
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negotiated.95 Scholars and commentators often pinpoint a 1993 case decided by
the Israeli Supreme Court as the first move towards a fair use-based regime.96 In
Geva v. Walt Disney Company,97 the Israeli Supreme Court established that parody
and satire were protected under the category of criticism in copyright law, and
enunciated for the first time a four-factor test modeled after 17 U.S.C. § 107.98
The 2007 law completed that move.99
Before the 2007 Copyright Act was enacted, the drafter of the bill, Tamir
Afori, answered several questions about the drafting process. When asked about
the reasons behind the preference for a fair use model in Israel, he framed fair use
as a mechanism of balance in a world of ever-increasing proprietary rights:
[The drafter of the bill] presented the development of fair use in Israel in
context. He emphasized that current Israeli law was insufficient to
protect… cultural works. That, despite the theoretical balance implied
by copyright, copyright has steadily increased in one dimension only—
the expansion of rights to copyrights holders. He presented his view
that fair use was a key element in the pursuit for balance and made
specific reference to Geva, whereby the closed list of allowable
purposes denied the possibility of fair dealing [sic].100

Incidentally, in its sweeping revision of 2007, Israel chose not to legislate on
Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) technologies,101 a move that attracted
prompt criticism from the United States Trade Representative and other
institutional representatives in the Global North.102 This is a welcome exception in

95. See Nair, supra note 90, at 17.
96. See Netanel, supra note 89.
97. CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Company, 48(1) P.D. 251 (1993) (Isr.).
98. Nair, supra note 90, at 15.
99. Id. at 11.
100. Id. at 34.
101. Id. at 9-10.
102. Israel was removed from the Special 301 Report in 2014, largely because of its patent reform
in 2010. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Israel Removed from Special 301
Report (Feb. 2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2014/February/Israel-removed-from-Special-301-Report.
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an environment of mounting pressure to adopt Northern-inspired intellectual
property legislation.
As far as limitations to exclusive rights are concerned, Israel embodies the
complete transition from fair dealing to fair use regimes. More importantly, this
particular transition offers evidence of intellectual property policies framed by the
promotion of balance and creativity, an example that should inspire developing
countries seeking to improve their copyright regimes.
Inspiration can also be drawn from the North. South Korea has also
adopted fair use.103 The most interesting feature of the Korean copyright law is not
the fact that it contains fair use provisions, but the way it repeatedly resorts to the
concept of fair use to inform its entire copyright law:104
Article 1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to protect the rights of authors and the
neighboring rights and to promote fair use of works in order to
contribute to the improvement and development of the culture and
related industries (emphasis added).105

It is remarkable that fair use is explicitly identified as a mechanism of balance
(indeed, as the mechanism of balance) between monopolistic rights and sociocultural goals. The Copyright Act also does a good job in linking fair use, as well
as the overall idea of balance in the copyright system, to the concepts of
“improvement” and “development.”106 It is especially interesting that “culture and
related industries” also figure in the opening lines of the Act (and in immediate

103. See Jaewoo Cho, As Korea Implements Fair Use, Two Cases Offer Precedent for Flexible
Copyright
Exceptions
and
Limitations,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG,
(Feb.
13,
2013),
http://infojustice.org/archives/28561.
104. South Korea Copyright Act, Act No. 432, Jan. 28, 1957, amended by Act No. 9625, April 22,
2009 (S. Kor.), http://www.moj.go.kr.
105. Id. art. 1.
106. Id.
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connection with fair use).107
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Much of the current discourse on “cultural,”

“creative,” or “copyright” industries is tied to expansive approaches to
copyright.108 When applied to industries in developing countries, this discourse
(Northern, in nature) is usually vehement in advocating for strong copyright
regimes.

Suggestions that fair use might be key to the “development” or

“improvement” of these industries are rare, and therefore it would be particularly
relevant for policymakers in the developing world to take the Korean law into
consideration when assessing their copyright environments.
Overall, there is an argument to be made that fair use models can
introduce an element of flexibility into domestic copyright laws. For developing
countries that adhere to this proposition, legal and historical heritages might
prevent them from considering the adoption of fair use models. However, recent
incorporation of generic fair use clauses (as well as ad hoc fair use) into copyright
laws in the South suggests a possible opening towards the expansion of these
models. Even outside South-South exchanges, the examples set by Israel and
South Korea should not go unnoticed in the developing world.
Among the largest economies in the South, the copyright laws of India
and South Africa contain fair dealing provisions, as a result of their former

107. Id.
108. See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2010, Creative Economy
Report 2010, xxiv, 171-79, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/3,
http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationArchive.aspx?publicationid=946. The same entity has published
reports on “Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development” with a specific focus on
Mozambique and Zambia. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Strengthening the
Creative Industries for Development in Mozambique, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/2,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20092_en.pdf; Strengthening the Creative Industries for Development
in Zambia, 2011, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2009/1,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ditctab20091_en.pdf.
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As emerging

economies in the South share experiences as part of a strategy to improve their
intellectual property regimes, fair use and fair dealing could become potential
topics for these exchanges.
2. Adoption of Flexible Licensing Mechanisms for Copyrighted Works
Amending or reenacting intellectual property laws—a process that would
be required for the incorporation of clauses like fair use, for instance—is a lengthy
process that is subject to several political and practical constraints.110 Making
copyright systems more balanced as a whole (or even contributing partially
towards that goal by incorporation of fair use regimes) is therefore a long-term
proposition.111
Inside copyright law, there are alternatives to counter the rigidity of
current maximalist regimes. One of those alternatives is flexible licensing, which
was pioneered on a large scale in 2002 with the launch of Creative Commons.112
Creative Commons (“CC”) licenses were created to respond directly to
the “explosion of copyright events caused by the proliferation of digital
technologies.”113 Relying on proprietary rights, these licenses enable copyright
holders to quickly and efficiently demarcate the scope of their monopolies, which
in turn facilitates permitted uses of their protected work:114

109. See infra, p. 24.
110. See DEERE, supra note 56, at 4; Barbosa, supra note 57.
111. And one that, if recent history repeats itself, will likely entails\ multiple failures.
112. History, CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG, creativecommons.org/about/history (last visited Feb. 12,
2015).
113. See Michael W. Carroll, Creative Commons as Conversational Copyright, in 1 INTELL. PROP.
& INFO. WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 445, 446 (Peter K. Yu, ed., 2007).
114. This aspect has led some scholars to refer to flexible licensing mechanisms as “conversation
copyright.” See id. at 452 (“Creative Commons copyright licenses embody a vision of conversational

SANTOS_MARCO.DOC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015

3/28/17 3:18 PM

SOUTH-SOUTH EXCHANGES: A RETURN TO TRIPS

119

A Creative Commons license is a form [of] copyright license that can be
linked to via the World Wide Web. The principle of a Creative
Commons license is to replace the default “all rights reserved” approach
with a more modest “some rights reserved” approach that permits a
variety of uses subject to one or more limitations that the copyright
owner has placed on the work. In addition to the legal code, the license
is described by a “human-readable” Commons Deed, which identifies
the key terms of the license and machine-readable metadata that
associate the Internet location of the licensed resource with the Internet
location of the license document. From the user’s perspective, the
presence of a Creative Commons license answers the question, “what
can I do with this” by assuring that, subject to the license conditions, the
user can: (i) copy the work; (ii) distribute the work; (iii) display or
perform the work; and (iv) make a digital public performance of the
work (i.e., Web casting).115

Originally seen as “a work in progress, an ongoing natural experiment”116 (and not
without its detractors),117 CC licenses quickly spread online.118 “Today, there are
over 882 million pieces of CC-licensed (or CC0) content on the web,”119 of which
approximately 56% is licensed under terms that allow “both adaptations and
commercial use.”120 The 2014 Report on the State of the Commons estimates that
in 2015, over 1 billion CC-licensed works will be reached.121

copyright. Within this vision, creators or copyright owners seek to facilitate use of their expression for
purposes such as dialog and education.”).
115. Id. at 448.
116. Id.
117. See e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a Worthy Pursuit, in THE
FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 1, 2 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie Guibault, eds., 2006) (forthcoming
2006).
118. Michael Carroll offers the following explanation for the popularity of CC licenses in the mid2000s. Carroll, supra note 113, at 455 (“What explains the rapid proliferation of Creative Commons
licenses on the Internet? Among those who choose the licenses, the explanations almost certainly are
varied, for indeed one size does not fit all. From the user’s perspective, however, the growth of the
licensed commons points up a new dimension for measuring relevance—the use value of information
found on digital networks…. For those seeking to use information drawn from the Web, works
available under a Creative Commons license have greater use relevance because the legal terms of use
over and above fair use are clearly specified.”).
119. State of the Commons, CREATIVE COMMONS (Nov. 2014),
https://stateof.creativecommons.org/report/.
120. Id. This type of Creative Commons license is known as “free culture license.” The most
commons type of license is BY-SA (attribution-share alike):
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While the bulk of CC licensing occurs in North America and Europe
(37% and 34%, respectively), there are signs of salutary activity in the Global
South, with Latin America capturing 10% of the share (against 16% in the AsiaPacific area, which includes large economies like China, India and Australia).122
In sub-Saharan Africa, the number falls to a modest 1% (the “Arab world” takes
the remaining 2%).123
With digital technologies expanding quickly even among some of the
poorest regions, an argument can be made that CC licenses can be especially
beneficial in struggling economies of the South. In these countries, transaction
costs associated with these licenses are lower than the cost of obtaining a
traditional license,124 and they increase legal certainty.125

Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. While in the North CC licenses can be considered “free,” in many Southern economies access to
tablets or computers remains a hurdle.
125. They do so in two ways: first, they are likely to increase certainty regarding ownership of digital
works; and second, as rights holders tailor their CC licenses to their specific needs, second-comers have
clearer indications regarding permitted uses of a given work.
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The following map (Fig. 2) shows the distribution of ongoing CC
licensing (as of 2014), with the darker colors denoting increased CC licensing
activity:

Figure 2: Creative Commons—Data by Country126
The only country in the Global South that matches (and in some cases
surpasses) the levels of CC licensing in the North is Brazil. This fact lends some
weight to the idea that CC licenses can positively impact copyright “dialogue” in
emerging and developing economies, although it comes with a cautionary note.
The Brazilian experience with Creative Commons is highly idiosyncratic.127
Former minister of culture Gilberto Gil played a pivotal role in propelling CC
licenses. Gil, one of the most popular and critically acclaimed singer-songwriters

126. Photo: State of the Commons, supra note 119.
127. See, e.g., Davide Maria Parrilli, Creative Commons Licenses in Brazil: Legal, Economic and
Social Implications, 8 (2) ICFAI U. J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 38 (May 27, 2009).
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in the history of Brazilian music,128 was appointed minister of culture by populist
president “Lula” da Silva in 2003.129 Until he quit in 2008, Gil pursued a policy of
cultural diversity and technological development.130
After Gil left, the Ministry of Culture removed the Creative Commons
logo from its official website.131 As the head of Creative Commons Brazil put it at
the time:
After this change the website of the Ministry of Culture has no license
that authorizes the use of the content that is there. The CC license has
been replaced by a phrase that from a legal standpoint does not mean
anything (“The contents of this site, produced by the Ministry of
Culture, can be reproduced provided that the source is cited”). Anyone
using the contents of the site faces a huge problem of legal uncertainty:
this usage does not have support in any legal document. Moreover, the
phrase that the Ministry put on the site to replace CC license refers only
to ‘reproduction’. CC licenses have a much broader and better
formulation, including collaborative production, the development of
derivative works, dissemination and so on.132

Ironically, on the same day the Ministry of Culture erased the Creative Commons
logo from its website, the Ministério do Planejamento, Orçamento, e Gestão
(roughly, Ministry of Planning, Budget, and Management) released its policy to

128. See Gustavo Krieger & Olimpio Cruz Neto, O Mito e o Ministro [The Myth and the Minister],
ROLLING STONE BRASIL (Nov. 2, 2006), http://rollingstone.uol.com.br/edicao/2/o-mito-e-oministro#imagem0; Gilberto Gil, PRODUÇĂO CULTURAL,
http://www.producaocultural.org.br/slider/gilberto-gil/ (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (Br.); Larry Rohter,
Gilberto Gil and the Politics of Music, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/12/arts/12iht-gil.4882061.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
129. See Latin America: The Return of Populism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 12, 2006),
http://www.economist.com/node/6802448.
130. Ariel F. Nunes, Pontos de cultura e os novos paradigmas das Políticas Públicas Culturais:
reflexões Macro e Micro-Políticas 1, in FUNDAÇÃO CASA DE RUI BARBOSA,
http://www.casaruibarbosa.gov.br/dados/DOC/palestras/Politicas_Culturais/II_Seminario_Internacional
/FCRB_ArielNunes_Pontos_de_cultura_e_os_novos_paradigmas_das_politicas_publicas_culturais.pdf.
131. See Ronaldo Lemos, A Legacy at Risk: How the New Ministry of Culture in Brazil Reversed its
Digital
Agenda,
FREEDOM
TO
TINKER
(Mar.
14,
2011),
https://freedom-totinker.com/blog/rlemos/legacy-risk-how-new-ministry-culture-brazil-reversed-its-digital-agenda/;
Marília Maciel, Brazilian Ministry of Culture Removes Creative Commons Licenses from its Website,
INFOJUSTICE.ORG (Jan. 23, 2011), http://infojustice.org/archives/867; Mônica Herculano, Site do MinC
Retira selo Creative Commons e Causa Polêmica [Ministry of Culture Site Removes Creative Commons
Seal
and
Causes
Controversy],
CULTURA
&
MERCADO
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://www.culturaemercado.com.br/politica/site-do-minc-retira-selo-creative-commons-e-causapolemica/.
132. Marília Maciel, supra note 131.
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promote Brazilian public software133 on the Official Journal, calling for “free
software and flexible licensing.”134
Even though institutional support for Creative Commons in general has
decreased since Gil left the Ministry of Culture, CC licensing remains higher in
Brazil than anywhere else in the South.135 If nothing else, the Brazilian experience
illustrates the viability of flexible licensing in developing economies where access
to digital technologies is fast becoming more widespread.
While TRIPS requires member states to protect certain categories of
works under domestic copyright laws,136 it does not prevent copyright owners from
giving away (or not exercising) some of their rights. Therefore, flexible and
expedited licensing does not contravene copyright law; rather, it is a mechanism
designed to increase the efficiency of copyright markets that is anchored in
copyright law itself. Creative Commons (or similar licensing frameworks) can
thus become valuable mechanisms to reduce transaction costs and increase legal
certainty in developing countries currently experiencing accelerated technological
leapfrogging.

133. See PORTAL DO SOFTWARE PUBLICO BRASILEIRO, http://www.softwarepublico.gov.br (last visited
Apr. 27, 2015). The expression “software público brasileiro” refers to open source software that is both
used and sponsored by the federal government. See Edgy Paiva, Use of Open Source Software by the
Brazilian Government, TECH. INNOVATION MGMT. R. (May 2009), http://timreview.ca/article/250
(describing, in English, the history of government-sponsored use of open source software in Brazil).
134. Herculano, supra note 131.
135. See Parrilli, supra note 127; State of the Commons, supra note 119.
136. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, art. 9(1) (incorporating articles 1 through 21 of the Berne
Convention).
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3. Reconsidering Formalities in Copyright Law
Modern copyright law is mostly devoid of formalities.137 While up to the
late nineteenth century formalities were generally a prerequisite for the existence
or exercise of copyrights, the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works established that international copyright
arises automatically and is enforced independently of formalities:
(2) The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise shall be independent of
the existence of protection in the country of origin of the work.
Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention, the extent
of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to the author to
protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by the laws of the
country where protection is claimed. (emphasis added)138

Formalities are “conditions precedent to the existence or enforcement of
copyright,”139 which include requirements regarding registration, deposit, notice,
recordation of transfers and assignments, and renewal of copyrights.140 These
conditions may be constitutive of copyrights (such as in the cases of notice or
renewal), or simply affect enforcement of existing copyrights (such as registration
or deposit).141
These prerequisites were in vogue until the early twentieth century142
because they can help (i) promote legal certainty when copyright disputes arise,143

137. See STEF VAN GOMPEL, FORMALITIES IN COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR HISTORY,
RATIONALES AND POSSIBLE FUTURE (2011).
138. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5, ¶ 2, Jul. 24, 1971, 1161
U.N.T.S. 18338 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (art. 4 ¶ 2 of the 1908 Berne Convention).
139. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The US Experience with Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate
Relationship, 33 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 311, 312 (2010).
140. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 17.
141. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 312.
142. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 1 (Although some countries began removing them in the late
nineteenth century).
143. Id. at 43.
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(ii) expedite rights clearance mechanisms,144 and (iii) “enhance the free flow of
information by enlarging the public domain.”145 While the 1908 revision of the
Berne Convention prohibited the imposition of formalities on foreign works,
throughout the twentieth century, most countries chose to remove formalities
affecting domestic works.146
In recent years, however, the development of digital and online markets
has triggered a wave of calls for a global reinstatement of copyright formalities.147
These calls appear to revolve around the first two functions that formalities have
classically been associated with—maintenance of legal certainty (now in the online
environment) and reduction of transaction costs in licensing processes.148 Some
authors go as far as suggesting that reinstating formalities would “facilitate
licensing and to cure the problem of orphan works” in the digital environment.149
Even under current international law,150 some types of formalities may
exist.151 As it has been pointed out, “not every record-keeping or even litigation-

144. Id. at 287.
145. Id. at 7-12, 287.
146. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 313.
147. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 139; Cecil C. Kuhne, III, The Steadily Shrinking Public Domain:
Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549, 562
(2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
471, 477, 518 (2003); Genevieve P. Rosloff, “Some Rights Reserved”: Finding the Space Between All
Rights Reserved and the Public Domain, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 37, 37 (2009); Christopher Sprigman,
Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485 (2004).
148. See Stef Van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or
Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1425, 1427 (2013); see also Sprigman, supra note 147,
at 487.
149. Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or Facilitators of Licensing, supra
note 148, at 1426.
150. The Berne Convention, supra note 137, art. 5 ¶ 2 (as incorporated by the TRIPS Agreement, supra
note 9, at art. 9 ¶ 1).
151. See VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137. Also, Ginsburg points out, Berne does not preclude the
imposition of formalities as a prerequisite for certain acts of enforcement. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at
315 (“In the sense of the Berne Convention, the formalities that art. 5(2) prohibits member States from
imposing on foreign authors include ‘everything which must be complied with in order to ensure that
the rights of the author with regard to his work may come into existence.’ Thus requirements such as
registration, the deposit or filing of copies, the payment of fees, or the making of declarations or
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related obligation a State imposes should be considered a Berne-banned
‘formality.’”152 Berne stands in the way of a full “reformalization” of copyright
law in general,153 but the core of prohibited formalities is composed of formalities
that are imposed on foreign authors and that include “everything which must be
complied with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his
work may come into existence.”154
(Re)introducing formalities like deposit or notice as prerequisites for the
recognition of copyrights of foreign authors would therefore be forbidden under
Berne,155 but certain “requirements of form,” for instance, are generally deemed
acceptable under the current international intellectual property regime.156 An
example of such a requirement would be mandatory recordation of copyright
transfers in a centralized database, which would help “determine the way in which
a transfer of copyright must be effectuated or which corroborate the existence or
scope of the relevant transaction,”157 but neither affects the constitutive dimension
of foreign copyright nor impairs enforcement of rights.158

affixing notices to copies of the work, may not be made mandatory preconditions to protection. But
State-imposed preconditions on the coming-into-being of the author’s rights represent only part of the
Berne-targeted formalities. An author may be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her rights
unless she complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit.”).
152. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316.
153. See Sprigman, supra note 147, at 562 (In particular, imposition of formalities at the level of
remedies is likely to trigger some concerns under Berne and TRIPS); see Ginsburg, supra note 139, at
317-18 (noting “conditioning certain remedies on registration of the work may be problematic.
Arguably, so long as a Berne Member State leaves basic claims for injunctive relief and statutory
damages unencumbered by formalities, it may limit the availability of enhanced remedies, such as
statutory damages, to compliance with registration or other obligations. However, ‘the difference
between a permissible conditioning of an enhanced remedy, and an impermissible conditioning of an
effective remedy may not always be apparent, thus making the distinction a delicate one in practice.’”).
154. SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS:
THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the Berne Convention).
155. Ginsburg, supra note 139, at 316-17.
156. VAN GOMPEL, supra note 137, at 204.
157. Id.
158. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 154, at 316-317.
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Another feature of the Berne Convention that is relevant for countries
considering the adoption of copyright formalities is the fact that the principle of
non-discrimination only applies to foreign works and authors.159

Differential

treatment of copyrighted works is therefore allowed, as long as the protection
afforded to foreign works is compatible with the principle of national treatment
encapsulated in Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement.160 In other words, foreign
works have to be treated at least as favorably as domestic works, but nothing
prevents a country from treating domestic works less favorably than foreign works.
In light of this framework, developing countries with specific interests in
promoting legal certainty and reducing transaction costs associated with copyright
licensing can incorporate Berne-compliant formalities into their legislations, and
they may do so targeting exclusively domestic works.

For instance, after

amending its law to comply with the Berne Convention, the United States decided
to impose registration of domestic (but not foreign) works as a prerequisite for
infringement actions.161
Countries where legal certainty regarding ownership of rights is
problematic may consider registration formalities targeting domestic works.
Already in the South, there are examples of this trend. Nigeria, for instance, has a
notification scheme partially inspired by the United States’ regime:
It is not a mandatory registration scheme but rather a platform to enable
authors [to] give notice of the existence of their work in which copyright

159. See, UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 74-75 (2005).
160. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3 (“Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this
Agreement to the nationals of other Members. . . “).
161. However, U.S. law makes registration a prerequisite for both foreign and domestic works for
obtaining statutory damages recovering attorney’s fees; in the absence of registration (up to three
months after publication of the work), copyright holders can only be awarded damages and profits in
cases of infringement of their work.
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subsists. Unlike the recordation system in the United States, failure by a
copyright owner to notify the Nigerian Copyright Commission through
the notification scheme on the existence of a work does not affect the
right of a copyright owner to commence an action in respect of an
infringement suit requiring enforcement.162

Countries concerned with increasing litigiousness or judiciary backlog may want to
adopt a system closer to the American model, while those focused on legal
certainty might opt for a regime closer to the Nigerian one.
4. Adoption of Take-and-pay Regimes to Promote Sectorial Interests
Proposals to establish liability regimes for specific kinds of intellectual
property rights are not new.163

Liability rules consist in the payment of an

“objectively determined value” for some sort of entitlement,164 and in the case of
intellectual property that entitlement is the monopoly of the author or the inventor.
Proponents of liability (or “take-and-pay”) regimes in intellectual property
contexts tend to emphasize arguments of economic efficiency over distributional
goals or other motivations in classic theory on liability rules.165 This trend is
especially salient in discourse regarding the digital environment, where case law
and doctrine on peer-to-peer infringement is often conflicting or unclear.166
While intellectual property liability regimes might lower transaction costs
as they replace traditional licensing mechanisms, they have been criticized for

162. Kunle Ola, Evolution and Future Trends of Copyright in Nigeria, 2 (1) J. OPEN ACCESS L., no.1,
2014 1, 6, http://ojs.law.cornell.edu/index.php/joal/article/view/26.
163. See Jerome H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L.REV. 2432, 2504 (1995).
164. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
165. See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF
DIGITAL SAMPLING (2011); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996),
166. And they are also at the core of proposal for reverse liability rules in digital copyright. MCLEOD &
DICOLA, supra note 165.
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“their lack of flexibility and for their susceptibility to political lobbying.”167
However, even commentators who acknowledge the general drawbacks of these
regimes concede:
[T]here would be transaction cost benefits to a compulsory license for
any copyrighted material integrated into a multimedia product. Such a
license would obviously eliminate many of the costs that currently
plague the multimedia industry.168

Proposals to create “default liability regimes” were originally construed with
patentable innovation in mind,169 but a growing number of commentators have
adapted liability to copyright law.170

Most of these proposals have users of

copyrighted goods in developed countries in mind.171

However, take-and-pay

regimes could be especially useful in the South, in countries with fast growing
industries that rely on production and distribution of digital goods.
Developing countries wishing to support the growth of copyrightintensive industries, for example, can benefit from offering a “fixed pricing
menu”172 for some uses of protected works, therefore avoiding the higher
transaction costs associated with atomized negotiation of licensing agreements. A
concrete example of this proposal would be the adoption of take-and-pay regimes
for music to be used in film.173 In developing countries where production and
distribution of digital film occurs at an extraordinarily fast pace and where budgets

167. Merges, supra note 165, at 1376.
168. Id.
169. See Reichman, supra note 163, at 2504.
170. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165, at 217-18 (arguing that traditional copyright regimes
might not be enough to incentivize creation in musical genres that depend on digital sampling). See
also Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural
Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
171. See MCLEOD & DICOLA, supra note 165; Netanel, supra note 170.
172. Merges, supra note 165, at 1377.
173. Id. at 1380.

SANTOS_MARCO.DOC.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

130

DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y

3/28/17 3:18 PM

VOL. 43:4

for production of original content are limited,174 a take-and-pay regime narrowly
aimed at expediting exchanges with the music industry could benefit nascent and
mid-sized film industries in the South.
5. Creation of a “Local Working Requirement”-like Provision in
Domestic Copyright Laws
The concept of “local working requirement” is synonym with patent law
and with the kind of innovation that the traditional TRIPS flexibilities were
designed to protect. However, this section argues that this specific feature of
patent law could inspire a similar mechanism to be used selectively in domestic
copyright laws of developing countries, particularly in connection with the cultural
industries.
Working requirements are rooted in article 27 of TRIPS175 and were
created to ensure the exploitation of patented inventions: “Local working
requirements require the patent holder to manufacture the patented product or
apply the patented process (i.e., “work” the patent) within the country granting the
patent rights in order to maintain its exclusive exploitive rights.”176
In patent law, some interpretations of article 27(1) of TRIPS have raised
concerns about the admissibility of local working provisions under international

174. An example of such an industry is Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry, which over the past few
years has disputed the title of second largest film industry in the world with India’s Bollywood
(Hollywood retains the first position). See Uchenna Onuzulike, Nollywood: The Birth of Nollywood:
The Nigerian Movie Industry, 22 (1) BLACK CAMERA 25 (2007); Olufunmilayo Arewa, The Rise of
Nollywood: Creators, Entrepreneurs, and Pirates, (U.C. Irvine School of Law, Research Paper Series
No. 2012-11) (discussing the intellectual property issues surrounding the Nigerian film industry);
Andrew Rice, A Scorsese in Lagos: The Making of Nigeria’s Film Industry, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 23
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/magazine/nollywood-movies.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
175. TRIPS Agreement supra note 9, at art. 27
176. Bryan Mercurio & Mitali Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The
Outstanding Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements, 19 Minn. J. Int’l L. 275, 281
(2010).
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law.177 Article 27(1) of TRIPS forbids discrimination based on place of invention,
field of technology and “whether products are imported or locally produced
(emphasis added).”178 If this article is interpreted as a stand-alone provision,
domestic legislations containing local working requirements can theoretically be
construed as discriminating against patents on goods that are imported or not
locally produced.179
However, TRIPS Article 2(1)180 incorporates significant portions of the
Paris Convention,181 including Article 5(A)(2), which was revised in the
Stockholm Conference of 1967 to allow for compulsory licensing to be issued in
cases of abuse of patent rights.182 The article goes on to list only one example of a
behavior that would qualify as abusive under Paris (and hence TRIPS) standards
and that example is precisely failure to work a patent.183
Even if the local working requirement has fueled discussion in the patent
field, international and harmonized domestic copyright law is not subject to the
177. See JUSTIN MALBON ET AL, THE WTO AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 48 (2014) (describing the potential tension
between TRIPS Article 27’s non-discrimination provision and local working provisions in domestic
legislations). See also Mercurio & Tyagi, supra note 176, at 286-287.
178. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 27.
179. See MALBON ET AL., supra note 177. This kind of interpretation derives from absolutist views of
Article 27, like the one favored by the WTO Panel in Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, in which the Panel endorsed the view that “discrimination means any form of differential
treatment.” Maria Victoria Stout, Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA
Pharmaceutical Patent Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 177, 180
(2008). See also Panel Report, Canada–Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, ¶ 7.98,
WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
180. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2 (“(1): In respect of Parts II, III and IV of this Agreement,
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the Paris Convention (1967). (2)
Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall derogate from existing obligations that Members may
have to each other under the Paris Convention, the Berne Convention, the Rome Convention and the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.”).
181. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828
U.N.T.S. 303.
182. Id. art. 5(A)(2) (“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures
providing for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”).
183. Id.; see GEORGE H. C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, AS REVISED AT STOCKHOLM IN 1967 (2007).
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non-discrimination clause of TRIPS Article 27. It would therefore be possible to
establish

normative

frameworks

for

local (meaning

national)

“working

requirements” for holders of assigned copyrights that are not exploiting their
monopolies.184 Under this proposal, if a local rights holder—a publisher, a
company, etc.—is not using the music or film whose rights it has acquired, then
the author of the work may regain control of the right or bundle of rights that he or
she has given away.185
Such a proposal would be especially effective for emerging cultural
industries in the developing world.

A “working requirement” would protect

misinformed authors and authors with poor bargaining tools who assign their rights
to entities that end up not using their work—and, hence, that do not foster the goals
that copyright regimes are supposed to incentivize.
A “working requirement” in domestic copyright law would therefore
advance the principles that TRIPS expressly seeks to promote. Article 7 of the
Agreement, entitled “Objectives,” states that
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
obligations.186

TRIPS frames intellectual property as a propeller of “social and economic
welfare.”187

Protecting parties in traditionally weaker bargaining positions

(authors) under the circumstances that would be subject to “copyright working

184. BODENHAUSEN, supra note 183, at 86.
185. See id.
186. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 7.
187. Id.
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requirements” would be consistent with this goal of promotion of welfare. This
proposal would also generate positive externalities, as authors who recapture their
rights after inactivity (or insufficient activity) of the assignee have arguably more
incentives to seek alternative chains to monetize their work. Additionally, the
requirement of “local working” in itself can be construed as a balancing
mechanism, in line with the spirit and letter of the last part of Article 7.
In addition to Article 7, TRIPS also lists a set of principles that inform
implementation of intellectual property regimes:
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures
are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of
intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology.188

A “local working requirement” in domestic copyright laws would also be
consistent with these principles, not only in face of the increasing socio-economic
relevance of the industries targeted by this proposal, but also because the behaviors
that would trigger the penalty inherent to a working requirement—i.e., inactivity,
insufficient activity of the rights holder—can potentially be construed as abuses of
intellectual property rights.

188. Id. art. 8.
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Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, often alluded to but generally underused,189
would therefore provide normative support if challenges to “working requirement”
in domestic copyright laws were to arise.
Although a “copyright working requirement” could be construed narrowly
to apply to one or more strategic industries, it could also be applicable
transversally. As I will argue with regard to moral rights,190 the best scenario
would be for “working requirements” to be generally applicable to all kinds of
copyrighted goods in a given country, but nothing would prevent a developing
country with a specific thriving industry to regulate only one kind of goods (e.g.,
film, crafts, and books) produced nationally. Several studies in the patent field
have shown that working requirements have been helpful for emerging economies,
particular in the case of pharmaceuticals.191 In spite of the differences between
regulation of patents and that of copyrights, these studies show that measures
geared towards a specific intellectual property-intensive industry can boost
performance within the industry and lead to spillover effects.192 The same logics
would apply with regard to the so-called “copyright industries” and therefore
policymakers in a given country may find a “local working requirement” necessary
(or socially/politically easier to implement) only in the case of one or two
industries.

189. See Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPs Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979
(2009).
190. See infra, pp. 41-45.
191. See, e.g., Kenneth Shadlen, The Politics of Patents and Drugs in Brazil and Mexico: The Industrial
Bases of Health Policies, 42 (1) COMP. POL. 41 (2009); Shamnad Basheer, India’s Tryst with TRIPS:
The Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, 1 INDIAN J. L. & TECH. 15 (2005); Mueller, supra note 14.
192. Id.
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A possible argument against this proposal is that analogies between
patents and copyrights are bound to be imperfect, as the two fields, while operating
under shared principles of classical intellectual property, obey different incentives
schemes and employ different strategies to cure market failures. However, this
would not be the first time that copyright doctrine borrows inspiration from
patents.193

Moreover, the overarching goal of bringing more stability194 and

fairness into copyright regimes would constitute an additional motive for
implementing “working requirements” in a field where such a notion would, at
first, be a transplant.
6. Removal of Paying Public Domains
While particularly prominent among developing countries in Africa and
Latin America, the idea of a paying public domain is actually Northern in origin
and scope. The concept of a “domaine public payant” was offered as early as 1858
by Pierre-Jules Hetzel in L a p ro p r i é t é l i t t é r a i re e t l e d o m a i n e p u b l i c
p a y a n t , 195 an idea to which Victor Hugo quickly subscribed.196 Largely based on
derivations of natural rights theories, the concept gained some recognition in the
French literary and artistic milieu in the late nineteenth century.197 This coincided
with the emergence arguments in favor of systemic protection of intellectual

193. Consider the concept of “substantial non-infringing use” that migrated from patent to the copyright
lexicon in American intellectual property law. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984). Admittedly, this is the narrowest of examples, but it shows that similar
exchanges are not unheard of.
194. “Stability” in the sense of restoring the rules of incentives that copyright supposedly gives authors
to create and disseminate their work.
195. See P I E R R E - J U L E S H E T Z E L , L A P R O P R I É T É L I T T É R A I R E E T L E D O M A I N E
P U B L I C P A Y A N T ( I m p r i m e r i e d e Ve u v e J . Va n G u g g e n h o u d t 1 8 5 8 ) ( F r ) .
196. Id.
197. LUCIE M. C. R. GUIBAULT ET AL., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS
IN INFORMATION LAW 90 (2006)
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property rights in continental Europe, which tended to emphasize the personality of
the creator as the main underlying justification for the grant of such rights.198
Countries sharing France’s legal traditions and philosophies also
considered adopting paying public domains during this period.199

Italy, for

instance, introduced a pubblico dominio pagante in 1865,200 but abolished it in
1996.201
In Eastern Europe, several countries implemented different forms of
paying public domains. The most interesting example is that of Hungary, which in
1978 introduced a paying public domain for works of art, but excluded audiovisual
works and sound recordings from the regime.202 However, the money collected
under this mechanism was distributed to all kinds of authors, including those of
audiovisual and literary works.203 Other countries in the region, like the Czech
Republic, adopted paying public domains during the Cold War period, but
abandoned this regime during the 1990s.204

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See LAURA CHIMIENTI, LINEAMENTI DEL NUOVO DIRITTO D’AUTORE: AGGIORNATO CON IL
D.LGS 118/2006 E CON IL D.LGS.140/2006, 347 (Giuffrè Editore 7th ed. 2006) (It.).
201. Id. at 347.
202. See CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY, SUMMARY OF THE HUNGARIAN COPYRIGHT LAW,
http://www.library.ceu.hu/hucop.pdf.
203. See KAROL JAKUBOWITZ & PIERRE JEANRAY, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: AUDIOVISUAL
LANDSCAPE AND COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 120 (Peter Barber Languages trans., 1st ed. 1994).
204. Id.
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Several developing countries have also experimented with variations on
the concept of the paying public domain, from the largest economies in the
South205 to more modest ones.206
The problem with paying public domains is that they impose the payment
of a tax-like fee on goods that are no longer protected by copyright.207 This can be
construed as de jure enclosure of the public domain.208 Even for those who resist
the definition of the fees associated with paying public domains as taxes, a paying
public domain results in the creation of an additional layer of protection
surrounding specific goods.

Justifications for granting additional layers of

protection should be evaluated in light of the principles that inform intellectual
property and cast IP rights as mediators between situations of market failure and
access to creative inputs freely available for reappropriation.
In some developing countries with paying public domains, it is not
unusual for the corresponding norms not to be enforced, a phenomenon that raises
questions about the existence of any market failures that payment of a fee might
cure. If enforced, paying public domain provisions have the potential to generate a
cultural gridlock economy,209 with chilling effects on every kind of creative
industry, and affecting also semi-formalized non-industrial cultural manifestations.

205.Argentina introduced the domínio público pagante, also known as domínio público oneroso, in
1958. See Decreto Ley 1.224/58, B.O. 14/2/1958, art 6, (Arg.),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/es/ar/ar070es.pdf.
206. For example, Ghana, which subjects public domain works to the payment of a fee. Copyright Act
(Act No. 690) art. 38(3) (2005).
207. See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66
SPG L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
208. Id.
209. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (discussing the broader gridlock effects that
an excessive intellectual property rights can generate).
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The World Intellectual Property Organization has offered an analogy on
this topic, likening paying public domains to compulsory licenses:
Under a system of domaine public payant, or “paying public domain,” a
fee is imposed for the use of works in the public domain. Generally, the
system works like a compulsory license: the use is conditioned on
payment of the prescribed fee but not upon the securing of a prior
authorization. The public domain to which such a regime applies is
usually only composed of works the copyright of which has expired
(except in countries applying it to expressions of folklore, as further
detailed below). In some countries, only the commercial or for-profit
exploitation of public domain material is subject to payment.210

If, as WIPO points out, a paying public domain is the equivalent of a generalized
system of compulsory licensing, then adopters of these regimes should ask
themselves if that is the economic and philosophical blueprint that they wish to
imprint on their culture and society. Compulsory licensing is a remedial means of
accessing intellectual property goods, not a generalized tax on unprotected works.
There is no legal or practical reason that would prevent a transition from the
current system into a truly open public domain. For instance, Chile switched in
1992 from a paying public domain regime for folklore to a public domain proper,
and there have been no reports of adverse effects on the vitality of Chilean folklore
music.211
This article therefore argues that countries that currently codify paying
public domains should consider their removal. Even if paying public domains
were the equivalent of a generalized system of compulsory licensing (which they

210. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Note on the Meanings of the Term “Public
Domain” in the Intellectual Property System With Special Reference to the Protection of Traditional
Knowledge and Traditional Cultural Expressions/Expressions of Folklore, at 12, ¶ 54,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/8 (Nov. 24, 2010).
211. See Severine Dusollier, WIPO, Scoping Study on Copyright and Related Rights and the Public
Domain, CDIP/7/INF/2 (Mar. 4, 2011).
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are not) legislators and policymakers in these countries should ponder whether this
potential cultural gridlock is a model they wish to imprint on their societies.
7. Reconsideration of Moral Rights
This is a residual suggestion, but one that is allowed by international
intellectual property law and that could expedite transformative uses of
copyrighted works throughout the developing world.
Moral rights were first protected internationally by the Berne
Convention212 in 1886,213 but common law countries resisted the idea of moral
rights for a long time.214 In the case of the United States, Article 6bis of Berne was
one of the main points of contention that prevented the country from ratifying
Berne for over a century, until 1988.215 In 1994, the TRIPS Agreement, which
incorporates Berne by reference in Article 9.1, expressly excluded moral rights
from its scope of protection.216 To this day, while protection for moral rights is not

212. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (stating
(1) Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. (2) The rights granted to
the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at
least until the expiry of the economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or
institutions authorized by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or
accession to this Act, does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all
the rights set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after
his death, cease to be maintained. (3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is
claimed.).

213. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Rights: A Study In The Law Of Artists, Authors, and
Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV., 554 (1940); Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (1997).
214. See Jane Ginsburg, Moral Rights in a Common Law System, 4 ENT. L. R., 122 (1990); Justin
Hughes, American Moral Rights and Fixing the Dastar “Gap,” 2007 UTAH L. REV. 659 (2007).
215. Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
216. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 9.1 (“Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of
the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appendix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or
obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that
Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.”).
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entirely absent from common law jurisdictions,217 they remain primarily associated
with droit d’auteur countries, both theoretically and in practice.
Criticism of moral rights stresses the fact that the concept of moral rights
hinges on a misleading construct: that the works protected by exclusive
monopolies somehow embody or display certain elements of the personality of the
author, and therefore it is necessary to further extend the protection afforded by the
economic core of the monopoly to encompass rights of attribution, integrity and
others.218 Nevertheless, there is still a widespread belief that moral rights, by
virtue of protecting authors qua authors, protect art and culture in itself, a view that
is often also endorsed in common law countries.219
In recent years, there have been attempts to frame strong moral rights
regimes as crucial balancing mechanisms in the digital world.220 Some scholars
suggest that this balancing function of moral rights can better equip developing
countries to incentivize creativity in the digital copyright era.221 While it is not
within the scope of this work to contribute to the discussion surrounding the
broader question of the usefulness of moral rights, this article submits that
217. Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1990) (In the United States, for instance, VARA was
passed in 1990 to regulate the rights of attribution and integrity in “works of visual art.”).
218. See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV., 263, 269 (2009).
219. Id. at 264 (“Moral rights scholarship is startling in its uniformity. Scholars take it as gospel that
moral rights are crucial for art to flourish and that, if anything, we need a more robust moral rights
doctrine. Commentators routinely lament the gap between our modest American moral rights laws and
the more expansive European ones. In contrast to copyright law, which has produced a vibrant body of
scholarship critical of the law’s excesses, the main scholarly criticism of moral rights is that they do not
reach far enough.”). Elsewhere, proposals to incorporate moral rights qua tale into common law
normative frameworks have invariably failed. Monica Kilian, A Hollow Victory for the Common Law?
TRIPs and the Moral Rights Exclusion, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 321, 335-36 (2003)
(proposing that moral rights be treated as an extension of the economic rights of the author as a way of
incorporating them into common law discourse).
220. See, e.g., MIRA T. SUNDARA RAJAN, MORAL RIGHTS: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICE AND NEW
TECHNOLOGY (2011).
221. See Mira T. Sundara Rajan, Moral Rights in Developing Countries, 8 J. INT’L INTELL. PROP. RTS.,
357, 358 (2003) (“The trend towards lower levels of protection for moral rights, a characteristic feature
of copyright reform around the world, is an entirely negative one. Moral rights have much to contribute
to culture and creativity in developing countries”).
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developing countries with emerging “copyright-intensive” industries should
reconsider their approach to moral rights.
Current copyright regimes establish strong moral rights frameworks
throughout the developing world.222 The economic and social advantages of the
existence of this kind of rights in places like Africa, for instance, have yet to be
determined. Beyond any problems that might affect theoretical justifications of
moral rights, there are drawbacks to protecting moral rights. They add yet another
layer of rights to protected works, which might translate into heightened
transaction costs for second-comers wishing to make transformative uses of those
works. Also, they increase legal uncertainty throughout the developing world, as
the body of law governing the application of moral rights clauses to specific
situations is not entirely clear,223 and is far less developed than the one we find in
Europe.
In an age where the concept of reappropriation in cultural production is
increasingly blurred,224 eliminating moral rights could expedite transformative uses
of these works by trimming down thickets of rights and reducing legal uncertainty.
Countries where copyright industries make (or are expected to make) strong
contributions to the local or national economy should consider suppressing moral
rights in their intellectual property laws.

222. See ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT 319 (Chris Armstrong et. al.
eds., 2010).
223. See Andrew Rens, No Answers: Butcher Boys, Artistic Freedom and Moral Rights, EX AFRICA
SEMPER ALIQUID NOVI, (Feb. 17, 2012), http://aliquidnovi.org/no-answers-butcher-boys-artisticfreedom-and-moral-rights/.
224. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY
(2008).
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In a way, the American experience with protection of moral rights in
visual art through the Visual Artists Rights Act (“VARA”)225 illustrates the
viability of circumscribed applications of moral rights. In the United States, a
historical antagonist of moral rights doctrine, ad hoc protection was conferred to a
specific category of work.226 This indicates that not all copyrighted works need to
be given the same levels of protection. Conversely, developing countries, longtime importers of moral rights frameworks, may come to discover that certain
industries can thrive without some of the entitlements they had before.
As stated above, protection of moral rights is neither prohibited nor
mandated by international intellectual property law.

Cultural and legal

heritages,227 social perceptions attached to the concept of morality, resistance to
change and pressure from proponents of expansive intellectual property regimes
might prevent developing economies from considering eliminating moral rights,
even in specific areas. A lesser alternative for countries with perpetual moral
rights that cannot be waived or assigned would be to reduce the duration of the
rights, as well as allowing for waivers and assignments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Regional cooperation among developing countries—most recently, in the
form of the BRICS Intellectual Property Offices Cooperation Roadmap—is poised
to focus primarily on patent law and policy, as well as on patent-flavored TRIPS

225. Visual Artists Rights Act § 106A .
226. See Edward J. Damich, A Comparison of State and Federal Moral Rights Protection: Are Artists
Better Off after VARA, 15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 953 (1993).
227. DEERE, supra note 56, at 37-63.
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flexibilities. Yet, there are other areas of intellectual property in which SouthSouth debate and exchanges have been consistently overlooked.
TRIPS is a minimum standards agreement with ample normative space
for countries in the Global South to incorporate provisions that foster their
domestic interests beyond the sphere of patent regulation. This article surveys a
set of TRIPS-compatible measures which, if adopted, would contribute to the
advancement of innovation and development agendas in the South without
increasing the overall levels of intellectual property protection.

